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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
complicated system of debit and credit accounting whereby
the account of each creditor and debtor is separately
identified. Shorn of its nugatory ramifications the problem
is quite as simple as the theory of set-off itself. "The keep-
ing back of something that is due because there is an equit-
able reason to withhold it."
12
Philadelphia, Pa. Ralph B. Umsted.
THE STATUS OF REPRODUCTION COST AS A
METHOD OF VALUATION FOR RATE-
MAKING PURPOSES
The recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad
Commission,' has provoked the present inquiry into the his-
tory of constitutional rate-making and more particularly
into the status of reproduction cost as a method of valua-
tion for rate-making purposes. A purely analytic discus-
sion of the matter, in view of the many factors involved in
the cases, would require a more exhaustive treatment than
may be here attempted. The approach is therefore historical.
2
The panic of 1893 and resultant low price levels made
reproduction cost as a measure of value very attractive to
consumer representatives. They early urged its advant-
ages upon the courts and commissions,3 and in at least one
lzMichigan Yacht Co. u. Busch, 143 Fed. 929.
'77 L. ed. (Adv. 820) (1933).
'The present discussion is largely indebted both for its general
method and for much of its source material to the scholarly article of E.
C. Goddard, The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction, 41 H. L. R. 564.
(1928).
3San Diego Water Co. v. City of San Diego, 118 Cal. 556, 50 Pac.
633, 636 (1897). Metropolitan Trust Co. of City of New York v.
Houston 6 T. C. R. Co. et al., 90 Fed. 683, 688 (1898).
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case met with success.4 It was clear however that to pre-
scribe reproduction cost as the sole test of value would pre-
cipitate a general failure of utility corporations. Their ex-
penditures had been frequently improvident5 and invest-
ments in them frequently lacked bona fide security.6 A
recognition of current economic facts indicated the need for
an elastic measure of value. Smyth v. Ames- was an at-
tempt to fill that need. The formula there announced is
now familiar:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calcula-
tions as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged
by a corporation maintaining a highway under legis-
lative sanction must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public.
And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost
of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its
bonds and stock, the present as compared with the
original cost of construction, the probable earning
capacity of the property under particular rates pres-
cribed by statute, and the sum required to meet oper-
ating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and
are to be given such weight as may be just and right
in each case. We do not say that there may not be
other matters to be regarded in estimating the value
of the property.""
4Steenerson et al. v. Great Northern R'y Co., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.
W. 713 (1897) where the court said, "No guaranty was ever given by
the state to the old road that the price of materials and the cost of con-
struction would not decline, or that capital invested in railroads should
not be subject to like viccisitudes as capital invested in other enterprises
.... the material question is not what the railrdad cost originally, but
what it would now cost to reproduce it."
51n Ames v. Union Pac. R. Co., 64 Fed. 165 (1894) it appears by
the defendant's admission that the road might have been reproduced for
$20,000 per mile (pp. 187), while the funded indebtedness of the road
averaged $46,000 per mile (pp. 185 exhibit 23).
6Arguments in Smyth v. Ames, 42 L. ed. 819 (1897); Opinion of
Brandeis, J., in Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 262 U. S. 277, 298, 67 L. ed. 981 (1922), E. C. Goddard,
The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction, 41 H. L. R. 564, 567.
'Supra. note 6.
$169 U. S. at 547. 42 L. ed. at 849.
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The decision made it clear that rates based on repro-
duction cost value alone would be regarded as confiscatory.0
The "matters for consideration" were not exclusive, nor
was any one of them entitled to particular consideration.
This compromise measure was satisfactory to the utilities
and they were for a time content to concentrate their efforts
upon the discovery or invention of new hypothetical cost
items for inclusion in the rate base.10
An almost unbroken rise in prices from 1898 to 1920
caused the utilities to look, with increasing favor upon re-
production cost as a measure of value. They were not slow
to urge the advantages of a criterion so manifestly favor-
able to themselves." The Supreme Court consistently
maintained its position that rates levied on a base estimated
without consideration for reproduction cost were confis-
catory and in violation of the due process clauses.12 A
curious antinomy resulted from the refusal of many com-
missions to accord the test any consideration whatsoever,"2
9The argument of Mr. Win, J. Bryan in Smyth v. Ames, 42 L. ed.
819, 825 squarely presented the issue, . . . the present value of the
roads, as measured by the cost of production, is the basis upon which
profit should be computed."
l0Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. ed. 371
(1908); Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56
L. ed. 594 (1911); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moine, 238 U. S. 153; 59
L. ed. 1244 (1914); State Public Utilities Comm. v. Springfield Gas and
Electric Co., 291 I11. 209, 125 N. E. 891 (1919).
lSee arguments of utility counsel in Knoxville v. Knoxville Water
Co., Supra. N. 10; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511,
48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151 (1913); Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Service Comm.. Supra. N. 6. Cf. for earlier utility attitude
Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin etc. Co., 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406
(1904).
12Smyth v. Ames, Supra. Note 6; San Diego Land and Town Co.
v. National City, f174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154 (1898),; Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382 (1908); Minnesota
Rate Cases, Supra. Note 11.
13For vigorous criticisms of reproduction cost see Danbury v. Dan-
bury and B. Gas and E. L. Co., PUR 1921D, 193. 206; Public Service
Comm. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., PUR 1916D, 947, 955; Re Northampton
Gas Petition, PUR 1915A, 618, 626. Cf. for later manifestations of
same attitude, Boise Artesian Water Co. v. P. U. C., 40 Idaho 690, 236
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and the attitude of the commissions was not without its
echoes in the courts." Mr. Justice Brandeis has well stated
the position of the recalcitrants:
"When the price levels had risen largely, and
estimates of replacement cost indicated values much
greater than the actual cost of installation, many com-
missions refused to consider valuable what one de-
clared to be assumptions based on things that never
happened, and estimates requiring the projection of the
engineer's imagination into the future, and methods of
construction and installation that have never been and
never will be adopted by sane men. "'5
In avoidance of the reiterated mandates of the Supreme
Court the commission sought to substitute for the applica-
tion of the rule, its mere profession."' Such an evasion
was short-lived. The point was raised in Missouri ex rel.
S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm. 1 7 The commis-
sion made the customary statement, "After carefully con-
sidering all the evidence as to values before us in this case
",'8 but in fact the replacement cost of only a few units
of the property was considered. 19 The Supreme Court of
Pac. 525 (1925): St. Louis and O'Fallon R. Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461,
73 L. ed. 798 (1929).
"4Marshall, J., dubitante, in Appleton Water W'ks Co. v. R. Comm.
of Wis., 154 Wis. 121, 154: 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, 806; 142 N. W.
476, condemnation proceeding (1913),
"5Brandeis, J. dissenting in Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Service Comm.. 262 U. S. 276, 300, 67 L. ed. 981, 990.
'SIn State Public Utilities Comm. v. Springfield Gas and Electric
Co., 291 111. 209. 125 N. E. 891, 900 (1920), the court quoted the com-
mission, "'After considering all the evidence and testimony in this
case bearing upon the value of the property herein ..... the commis-
sion finds the fair value of the respondent's gas property . . .' . . . Not-
withstanding this statement of the commission, we are convinced from
an examination of the record that it did not give due consideration to
that element known as 'going value'." See also Missouri ex rel. S. W.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276, 286. 67 L. ed.
981, 984 (1923).
17Supra. N. 6.
28Idem 286 and 984.
191dem 283, 284 and 983.
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the State of Missouri upheld the action of the commission. 20
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment,
saying,
"It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to
a fair return upon properties devoted to public service
without giving consideration to the cost of labor, sup-
plies, etc., at the time the investigation is made. An
honest and intelligent forecast of probable future values,
made upon a view of all the revelant circumstances, is
essential. If the highly important element of present
costs is wholly disregarded, such a forecast becomes
impossible. Estimates for tomorrow cannot ignore
prices of today.
'
'21
In a separate opinion which has become a classic Mr.
Justice Brandeis (with the concurrence of Mr. Justice
Holmes) championed the prudent investment theory.22 The
court reiterated the rule in Blue feld Water Works and Im-
provement Co. v. Public Service Commission," decided later
in the the same year, and in Georgia Railway and Power Co.
v. Railroad Comm.,2 4 decided on the same day as the latter
case, fixed its extrinsic limitations. If the constitutional in-
hibitions on confiscation are to be avoided, reproduction
cost must be given actual consideration, but it is not syn-
onymous with fair value nor the sole test thereof. 25
20State ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
... Mo..... 233 S. W. 425.
21Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262
U. S. 276, 287, 288; 67 L. ed. 981, 985 (1923).
2zidem 289 and 985.
23262 U. S. 679, 689, 67 L. ed. 1176, 1181 (1923). The court said,
"The record clearly shows that the commission in arriving at its final
figures, did not accord proper, if any, weight to the greatly enhanced
costs of construction in 1920 over those prevailing about 1915 and before
the war, as established by uncontradicted evidence; and the company's
detailed estimated cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, at 1920
prices, appears to have been wholly disregarded. This was erroneous."
Note: Mr. Justice Brandeis again concurred on separate grounds.
24262 U. S. 625, 67 L. ed. 1144 (1923).
25idem opinion of Brandeis, J. It is of interest to note that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has recently adhered to this rule in Clark's
Ferry Bridge Co. v. P. S. C., 108 Pa. Super. C.. 19, 67; 165 Adt. 261,
267, (1933).
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The question did not long remain static. In Monroe Gas-
light and Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Comm.20 the
federal court announced as the rule of the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Case the proposition that reproduction cost
was, .the dominating element in the fixing of the rate base."
Like statements were made in other federal lower court de-
cisions,7 though this novel doctrine was not without its
critics.28  Until 1926 the rule, as extended, did not undergo
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. The question was pre-
sented in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.
20
On petition of the Indianapolis Water Company for a
higher rate schedule, the Public Service Commission of
Indiana made an order, effective January 1, 1924, pre-
scribing new rates based on the cost of reproducing the
property of the utility at average prices over a ten year
period ending with 1921. The rate base fixed by the com-
mission was $14,904,000. The company brought suit in
the United States District Court seeking to enjoin the en-
forcement of the rate on the ground that it was confiscatory
in that the commission had ignored the company's un-
impeached evidence of spot reproduction cost in the amount
of $19,000,000. The injunction was granted, the District
Court saying,
"Granting that these cases (citing S. W. Bell Tel.
Case, Bluefield Case, and Georgia R'y and Power Co.
Case) were decided at a time when the court had, as a
matter of history in this particular field of jurisprud-
ence, full cognizance of the probative character and
the propriety of considering evidence such as is popul-
arly called evidence of historical cost, evidence of re-
production cost upon a certain price level, evidence of
26292 Fed. 139, 143 (1923).
27Van Wert Gaslight Co. v. P. U. C., 299 Fed. 670, 673 (1924);
New York Tel. Co. v. Prendergast, 300 Fed. 822, 824 (1924); Westing-
house Electric and MTg. Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 3 Fed. (2nd)
285, 297 (1924); Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Prendergast, 6
Fed. (2nd) 243, 280 (1925). Cf. master's report in New York and
Richmond Gas Co. v. Pendergast, 10 Fed. (2nd) 167, 171 (1925).
28Ashland Water Co. v. R. Comm., 7 Fed. (2nd) 924, 927 (1925)
29272 U. S. 400, 71 L. ed. 316 (1926).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
value which is called prudent investment value, and,
fourth, evidence of what is strictly and technically re-
production spot depreciated at the time of the inquiry;
these cases press upon us sharply the query of why
these cases, in their results, disclose the emphasis given
to the last named of these four characters of evidence;
and I am entirely content to accept the characteriza-
tion made by the judges in the sixth circuit in the so-
called Monroe Gas Case; that the necessary implica-
tion from their results is that dominating consideration
should be given to evidence of reproduction value and,
if that means anything, it means that evidence of re-
production value spot at the time of the inquiry must
be considered as evidence of a primarily different
character from either of the other three kinds of evi-
dence... ",0
On appeal to the Supreme Court the decree was affirm-
ed. The holding there is less explicit. Apparently the
pronouncements of the District Court were not sufficiently
provocative to elicit a direct response. It was however
said,
"It is true that, if the tendency or trend of prices
is not definitely upward or downward and it does not
appear probable that there will be a substantial change
of prices, then the present value of land plus the pres-
ent cost of constructing the plant, less depreciation, if
any, is a fair measure of the value of the physical ele-
ments of the property." 's
On the facts the Supreme Court was not required to
adopt the language of the District Court, and indeed the
affirmance demanded no extension of the doctrine of the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Case. But the language of
the court does go beyond the latter holding in giving to re-
production cost a qualified dominance when price levels
show no substantial variation. Mr. Justice Brandeis dis-
sented on the ground that the court had made spot repro-
duction cost the equivalent of value. Mr. Justice Holmes
did not concur in this sentiment, and although subsequent
30Supra. N. 5, dissent of Brandeis, J., McCardle v. Indianapolis
Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 422, 71 L. ed. 316, 329 (1926).
81272 U. S. 400, 411, 71 L. ed, 316, 325 (1926).
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lower court decisions were not too definite in their explana-
tion of the McCardle Case,3 2 they scarcely seemed to sub-
stantiate the Brandeis dissent. Thus the case was not re-
garded as inconsistent with Smyth v. Ames,3 and it has not
been forgotten that the statements of the Supreme Court
were qualified.3 '
In St. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. United States"5 the
status of reproduction cost as a measure of value was again
before the Supreme Court. By paragraph four of section
15a of the Interstate Commerce Act it was provided that
in making valuations for purposes of recapture:
"The commission . .. shall give due consideration
to all the elements of value recognized by the law of
the land for rate-making purposes ... ""
The commission made a recapture order against the
St. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Company. In fixing valuation
for the purposes of this order evidence of reproduction cost
was before the Commission,"7 but it did not appear that
they gave that evidence real consideration.88  The order
was attacked in th% statutory federal court on the ground
that, "the Commission measured such value upon the as-
sumed prudent investment basis and failed to give 'effective
32See Tenner v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 Fed. (2nd) 226, 228
(1927); Kansas City So. R'y Co. v. U. S., 19 Fed. (2nd) 591, 599
(1926); Graff v. Town of Seward, 20 Fed. (2nd) 816, 818 (1927);
Worcester Electric Light Co. v. Atwill, 23 Fed. (2nd) 891, 892 (1927);
Cambridge Electric Light Co. v. Atwill, 25 Fed. (2nd) 485, 487 (1928);
Los Angeles Railway Corp. v. Railroad Comm., 29 Fed. (2nd) 140, 146
(1928); Queen's Borough Gas F Electric Co. v. Prendergast, 31 Fed.
(2nd) 339, 352 (1928); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 34 Fed. (2nd) 185,
196 (1929).
33Los Angeles R'y Corp. v, R'y Comm., Supra N. 1.
34Kansas City So. R'y Co. v. U. S., Supra. N. 32 and Cf. Tenner
v. Denver Tramway Co., Supra N. 32.
35Supra. N. 13.
3841 Stat. at L. 488 Chi. 91, U. S. C. title 49, Sec. 15 a.
.3Dissent of Stone, J., St. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. U. S., 279
U. S. 461, 549, 73 L. ed. 798, 809 (1929).
asst. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 486, 73
L. ed. 798, 809 (1929).
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and dominant consideration 4 . . to the cost of reproduction
at the price levels existing at the time the issue arises'.
39
The court held, "that the verity of the Commission's valua-
tion herein need not be examined and cannot affect this re-
capture order ..... 40 An appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court, and the majority of that body felt that the validity
of the Commission's valuation was directly in issue. The
court pointed out its own familiar pronouncement that the
"elements of value recognized by the law of the land for
rate-making purposes" included the element of reproduction
cost at the time of valuation:
"The question on which the Commission divided
is this: When seeking to ascertain the value of rail-
road property for recapture purposes, must it give con-
sideration to current, or reproduction costs? The
weight to be accorded thereto is not the matter before
us. No doubt there are some, perhaps many, railroads
the ultimate value of which should be placed far below
the sum necessary for reproduction. But Congress
has directed that values shall be fixed upon a consider-
ation of presentcosts along with all other pertinent
facts; and this mandate must be obeyed.""
Mr. Justice Brandeis's lengthy dissent, in which Justices
Holmes and Stone concurred, took the position that the
'main question for consideration is that of statutory con-
struction", and that it was not the intention of Congress
that the carrier's property should be valued at its reproduc-
tion cost.4 2 The language of the majority opinion brings
to mind the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and
Bluefleld cases. Certainly it makes no expansion of the
doctrine there stated. The rule of the McCardle Case was
3Sst. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. U. S., 22 Fed. (2nd) 980, 983
(1927).
40idem at 984.
41St. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 487, 73
L. ed. 798, 810 (1929).
42idem, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 279 U. S. at p.
488; 73 L. ed. at 810.
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not involved, and the holding there was not affected by the
present decision."
The import of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commis-
sion44 is a matter of some conjecture. It is very natural to
give an undue importance to what is recent; it is also a very
simple matter to fail to see the woods for the trees. Pre-
liminarily it is necessary that the facts be fully stated.
The Railroad Commission of California had since 1917
fixed the rates of the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Com-
pany, issuing orders for that purpose in 1917, 1919, 1921,
1923, 1926 and 1928. Concluding that the return yielded
under the order of 1928 was too great, the commission re-
duced the company's rates by an order of 1930. As the
basis of this latter order the commission made two valua-
tions. By an "historical cost" method the value of the util-
ity property was placed at $60,704,000. The commission
took the value of the property as established by their order
of 1917 and added to that the net additions and betterments
shown on the utility books. Allowances for land were
made on a basis of present values. The commission in-
cluded in this valuation an obsolescent artificial gas plant,
as the investment therein had been made "prudently and in
good faith". Secondly, the commission fixed the "fair
value" of the utility property at $65,500,000. This figure
represented a calculation of reproduction cost new as of
the year 1930, no deduction for depreciation being made.
The utility brought suit in the federal district court to
enjoin the enforcement of the order alleging that on the
basis of reproduction cost new as of January 1, 1930 the
fair value of its property was $95,000,000. It is interesting
to compare this figure with the commission's estimate of
$65,500,000 reached by the same method. The differences
43"The weight to be accorded thereto is not the matter before us."
St. Louis and O'Fallon R'y Co. v. U. S. Supra. N. 13. For the same
construction of the decision see New York Tel. Co. v. Prendergast, 36
Fed. (2nd) 54, 59 (1929); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Moynihan, 38 Fed.
(2nd) 77, 88 (1930).
' 4Supra N. 1.
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are these: The commission made no deduction for de-
preciation; the utility felt that $3,470,326 should be deducted
under that head. Such a deduction brings the commission's
figure to $62,029,674. The utility sought to include items
of cost of financing, promoter's remuneration and going
concern value in the amount of $17,650,137; the commission
disallowed these items. Included they bring the figure to
$79,679,811. It was the contention of the utility that over-
heads should be allowed at 24.27%; the commission allowed
them at the rate of 6%. The difference in this calculation
amounts to $14,557,502. This amount being included the
value of the property reaches the sum of $94,247,313 or in
round numbers $95,000,000. If this comparison has mean-
ing, it indicates that the controversy involved, not the
method of valuation, but the proper elements to be consid-
ered thereunder. Then the status of methods of valuation
was not presented to the courts in this litigation and their
statements in regard thereto have the force of mere dicta.
But whatever the logical merits of such a position may be,
it is scarcely tenable in the face of the words of the opinion.
The District Court dismissed the bill, observing that
the valuation gave weight both to current market prices and
the amount of the investment. The utility took an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the District
Court. The opinion is from the pen of Chief Justice
Hughes. Preliminarily it is said that the court in determin-
ing whether or not rates are confiscatory is not bound by
any artificial formulae. 5 All the relevant facts are to be
considered. The language of the court then takes an un-
familiar turn,
"The actual cost of the property-the investment
the owners have made--is a relevant fact. But while
cost must be considered, the court has held that it is
not an exclusive or final test . . . The property on
any admissible standard of present value, may be
worth more or less than it actually cost. The time
and the circumstances of the outlay, and the effect of
'5idem 830.
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altered conditions demand consideration. Even when
cost is revised so as to reflect what may be deemed to
have been invested prudently and in good faith, the
investment may embrace property no longer used and
useful for the public . . . But no one would question
that the reasonable cost of an efficient public utility
system 'is good evidence of its value at the time of
construction'. We have said that 'such actual cost
will continue fairly well to measure the amount to be
attributed to the physical elements of the property so
long as there is no change in the level of applicable
prices'. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co...
And when such a change in the price level has oc-
cured, actual experience in the construction and de-
velopment of the property, especially experience in a
recent period, may be an important check upon ex-
travagant estimates. '
' 4 6
Actual cost, then, has taken on new importance. It is
considerable evidence of fair value, and the extent to which
it coincides with that hypothetical figure will depend upon
the extent to which it represents property used and useful,
the recentness of the period within which investment has
taken place 4 7 and (by implication of the facts) the extent
to which the investments of the utility have been under the
control of the commission.
Reproduction cost is a fact which "should have appro-
priate consideration.""' It does not however "justify the
acceptance of results which depend upon mere conjecture."" 9
Mr, Justice Butler dissented in a not entirely un-
ambiguous opinion in which Mr. Justice Sutherland
joinedsO
"The Commission following theories that admit-
tedly are contrary to our decisions in confiscation
'
6 idem 830.
'7 idem 831, "In determining the weight to be ascribed in the instant
case to historical cost as shown by the evidence, the outstanding fact
is that the development of the property had, for the most part, taken
place in a recent period."
48 idem 830.
4 9idem 831 quoting Minnesota Rate Cases, Suppa N. 11.
60idem 838.
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cases, refused to ascertain or consider the value of the
property.51 It made the last reduction upon mere cost
figures."52
It would seem that the real quarrel of the dissenters is
with the tendency of the majority opinion which is clearly
favorable to a less arbitrary application of reproduction
cost methods. Justices Butler and Sutherland have long
stood in the vanguard of the cost of reproductionists.
To attempt a classification of these difficult cases is
perhaps a delusive undertaking. If the language of the in-
stant decision is to be taken without adulteration, the cycle
from Smyth u. Ames is complete, although it may well be
that the doctrine of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-
pany Case is not impaired. If the McCardle Case is to be
interpreted as giving a qualified dominance to reproduction
cost as a measure of value, it must be regarded as tacitly
reversed. The language of the Los Angeles Gas Case, as
has been previously indicated, may well be taken with a
grain of salt, but its closest parallel in the history of this
vexed question is the classic statement of Smyth v. Ames.
James K. Nevling.
5iThis statement is somewhat clarified by an examination of the
appended note wherein it is demonstrated that the California Commis-
sion has persistently defied the mandates of the Supreme Court by evalu-
ating for rate-making purposes upon a basis of historical or actual cost,
taking land at current values.
52If this means actual cost can it fairly be said to represent the
facts? The commission's reproduction cost figures exactly coincide with
its fair value figures.
